The paper looks at resolutions and operational activities of the UN as parts of processes of institutionalisation of nascent norms of CIL. It argues that institutionalisation clarifies the scope of the norm and of its application; and improves mechanisms of persuasion and compliance with the norm, thereby increasing social pressure on resilient States. Hence, institutionalised norms have a higher potential to affect both the behaviour and attitude of States than noninstitutionalised norms. Crucially, the paper argues that UN resolutions and activities foster processes of institutionalisation of new norms. Although the work acknowledges that is not possible to foresee whether a norm will crystallise as CIL, it suggests that its potential increases if it matches and draws on the normative framework provided by the UN Charter; if it does not excessively challenge the predominant expectations of States, and if UN organs work together in promoting it.
Introduction

In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.
1 "psychological pressure upon a government not to vote against a law-creating resolution if virtually all other states are likely to vote for it" 10 ('Method IV'). Besides, she underscored "the intermingling in resolutions of developing norms with well-established rules" 11 ('Method V'). These Methods broadly match similar descriptions that other scholars have made of the processes through which states change their behaviour and attitude or, technically, learn in international social processes. 12 Finally, in her book, Higgins mentioned the role of the subsidiary organs of the UN in promoting new law ('Method VI'). In this latter respect, recalling the Congo Case, she asserted that "new institutional arrangements generate law and procedures" 13 (which in a manner resonates with Method V). I argue that these 'methods' are mutually reinforcing and may be roughly organised as follows: Class A) Methods I to IV aim at changing the behaviour and attitude of states, notably through the generation of social pressure; and Class B) Methods V and VI aim at promoting the nascent norm through its institutionalisation, ie, its embedding in aggregates of norms and practices. As becomes clearer below, Class B Methods foster those in Class A.
Indeed, institutionalisation of a norm has a great potential to affect the behaviour and attitude of states because, inter alia, it promotes the clarification of the norm, enhances complianceinducing mechanisms, and fosters participation of different states in the law-making activity, all of which create social pressure on resilient states. In a well-known text, Charney describes a modern process of customary law-making, which he calls "general international law", 14 and which he grounds on article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 15 Looking at the contribution of International Organizations ('IOs') towards the development of CIL, Charney argues that the creation of CIL has become "more structured … specially in the case of important normative developments". 16 In an attempt to systematise the description of the process of creation of CIL,
Charney proposes that a norm may emerge and gain strength in a multilateral forum before the norm's diffusion and augmentation outside that forum. Indeed, he outlines the following order to these events: articulation of new norms in reports, resolutions, draft treaties etc; debate about the norm within the multilateral forum in question; communication to states present in the forum that the norm in question is intended to have legal character; diffusion of the norm to interested states outside the original forum; further debate about the norm that confirms "the normative status of the rule"; 17 increasing voluntary compliance with the new norms that crystallises it as CIL. 18 Charney clearly asserts that this is a deliberative process very close to the legislative process in domestic systems.
19
What Charney describes may look like mere aspects of the law-making activity that occurs at the level of IOs. I prefer to look at the outline that he presents as a general depiction of a process of institutionalisation of international norms, and I am concerned with the effects that this process has on the strengthening of the norm and on the behaviour and attitude of the states. According to Charney, this new process is more democratic and more transparent than traditional customary law-making, and provides states with real opportunities to oppose the development of new norms; 20 it is less amenable to abuses than traditional customary law-making; 21 it allows for the effective communication that new norms are under consideration; 22 it may replace traditional customary law-making in respect to "matters with pronounced lawmaking potential" 23 and in matters of technical character, 24 and its outcomes are "endowed with substantial legitimacy, creating a strong pull toward compliance". 25 What is more, this process "greatly extends the international community's ability to clarify the intended scope and applicability of the norm under consideration".
26
From one perspective, both Higgins' 'methods' and, notably Charney's process of lawmaking of 'general international law' may be studied on the assumption that IOs are mere agents 17 Ibid 546. 18 Ibid 543-546 19 Ibid 547. Cf with J E Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, 2006) 594 (arguing that the process "approximates the intentional process involved in treaty-making") and, generally, chapters 3, 4, and 10. 20 Charney, above n 12, 547. See below nn 79, 82 and accompanying text. 21 Ibid 548. See below nn 82, 94 and accompanying text. 22 Ibid 549. See below nn 91-97 and 129-131 and accompanying text. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid 550. See below nn 28 to 30 and accompanying text. See below Section 2.1.1. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. of the states. 27 However, this understanding overlooks the intensity of the behavioural and attitudinal changes that these 'methods' and 'new law-making' often inflict on states. In contrast, I suggest that we approach these 'methods' and 'new law-making' as interconnected social processes in which states continually learn to identify themselves, redefine their interests in respect to specific problems and, consequently, adopt new norms of behaviour. I argue that, from this second perspective, the analysis sheds light on the manners through which IOs promote the formation of CIL. Specifically, in the present article, I place focus on the processes of institutionalisation of emerging norms of CIL through the work of the political and subsidiary organs of the UN, and on the effects of this institutionalisation on the norms and on the states. As it develops, institutionalisation clarifies the scope of the norm and of its application; it improves mechanisms of persuasion, as well as enhances the monitoring of levels of compliance with the norm, thereby increasing cultural and social pressure on resilient states; in addition, it may promote the specialisation of the norm as a legal rule of CIL. As I explain below, resolutions and activities are an important part of processes of institutionalisation of new norms.
Before proceeding, it is critical to provide the contours of the contexts that are at the core of the subject of research. These are contexts in which the identities and interests of states are not stabilised and through which institutions experience ongoing change. In the present-day world, it is reasonable to assume that the institutions, as well as the individual and collective identities and interests of states, at least in respect to human rights and international security-also on themes such as environment and climate change law and certain aspects of international economic laware far from stable. 28 Moreover, these and similar topics require specialised knowledge and collective responses. This scenario affects the emergence of new norms in the field, and provides renewed opportunity for international organisations and certain non-state actors ('NSAs'), to influence the formation of new norms. Their participation in these processes has already been the 27 Ibid (acknowledging that international organs do not have "independent legislative authority"). 28 
2.1.
Progressive institutionalisation of nascent CIL
In their day-to-day affairs in the international sphere, to attain their respective objectives and carry out their respective mandates, organs of states and IOs articulate, promote, and use new norms.
As mentioned, this process is cost-effective because it facilitates learning by states. 46 It is often the case that, only after a norm has crystallised as a rule of CIL, an observer is capable of discerning, with the benefit of hindsight, that the first articulation of the norm by a given organ was crucial for the evolution of the norm, and that the use of the norm by different organs in different places was crucial for its crystallisation as CIL. As these processes evolve they leave traces of different kinds: scholars and practitioners regard these traces as evidence of the formation and existence of 45 The term agency has a specific meaning in the Charter articles 57-59. 46 Missing the potential that this 'new form' of 'generation' of CIL has, to spare states from the traumatic process of learning through mistakes (which too often involved resort to violence), Dupuy referred to the "modern" process as coutoume sauvage. identification of a rule of customary international law the existence of a general practice is often the initial factor to be considered, and only then an inquiry is made into whether such general practice is accepted as law, this order of inquiry is not mandatory. The identification of a rule of customary international law may also begin with appraising a written test or statement allegedly expressing a certain legal conviction and then seeking to verify whether there is a general practice corresponding to it". the norm-entrepreneur. 56 This having been said, it is important to note that another class of organs and institutions often intervene in the process that leads to the emergence of a norm in the international community of states-namely, organs and institutions that occupy the highest levels of their respective bureaucracy. 57 Because they represent their respective states and IOs, it is possible to affirm that such states and IOs have formally adopted the norm. Hence, at this very incipient stage, technical institutions and organs, norm-entrepreneurs and political organs intervene to push the norm forward to the next stages.
Cascade
The first group of states that support the norm constitute the 'leading states', which are important because they create social pressure on other states. Consequently, in different states and IOs, 
Internalisation
It is crucial to examine the concept of internalisation. Finnemore and Sikkink emphasised the total internalisation of norms by the state, and consequently they placed it at the end of the norm cascade. 60 In contrast, the concept of internalisation that I adopt emphasises the progressive internalisation of the norm as a rule of law, 61 and considers the importance of international and domestic organs and institutions in pushing other organs of a given state to adopt the norm, in a manner that makes the practice and opinio juris of the state in question progressively clear.
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Governments may do so by affirming the norm as a rule of law through statements and favourable voting at different fora, diplomatic acts and communications, and the signing and ratification of treaties. Moreover, they may direct lower organs to comply with and implement the rule, in which case the latter is implemented on the ground. Parliaments may also incorporate the rule into domestic legislation and courts and tribunals, enforce it through judicial mechanisms. Note, however, that internalisation of the norm begins at a much earlier stage, ie, at the emergence stage, when the norm was nothing more than a prescription. This is because the technical organs involved at the earlier stage were likely to be in contact with their equivalents from other countries and from IOs. In other words, in this perspective, lower institutions promote the formal 59 Finnemore and Sikkink, above n 34, 900. 60 Ibid 904-905: "At the extreme of a norm cascade, norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalised by actors and achieve a 'taken-for-granted' quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic. For this reason, internalised norms can be both extremely powerful (because behaviour according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform). Precisely because they are not controversial, however, these norms are often not the centrepiece of political debate and for that reason tend to be ignored by political scientist". In the same vein, see Droubi, above n 31, 84-85. 61 Similarly, H H Koh, 'Internalization through Socialization' (2005) From an analytical standpoint, the authority works in different manners. Formally, it gives closure to past processes because it ascertains the existence of a rule of CIL, which is typically a lawapplying activity. Moreover, the affirmation of the authority-that a rule is CIL-may shed light on a reality-the rule is CIL-that had not been clear to all states. 67 In this case, the affirmation makes it possible for States to see the rule in question as CIL, which in turn strengthens the rule.
Hence, the affirmation may have a performative effect on the behaviour and attitude of states. [3] : "where the existence of a general practice accepted as law cannot be established, the conclusion will be that the alleged rule of customary international law does not exist". 74 Droubi, above n 31, 78: "rather than assessing whether the practice of organs of one state is uniform in supporting the norm, the appropriate exercise for the ascertainment of the formation of a customary international legal rule requires an assessment of the reasons for actions taken by the different organs". Cf with Colombian-Peruvian Asylum (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 277: "The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence". 75 See Droubi, above n 31, 81 et seq. 76 Charney, above n 12, 539: "Customary law results from political decisions to take the steps necessary to form a rule". 77 Castañeda employs the expression "quasi-legal" to describe the "amorphous and mobile reality of this legal sector", in which "there are no tangible, clear, juridical criteria to demarcate with precision the zones of binding force": J Castañeda, 91 Kratochwil, above n 58, 39 (the author notes that legal topoi justify the exlusion of many "practical arguments" in a "discourse on grievances" and limit the "range of relevant facts and proofs" Higgins argues that the political organs of the UN are "vitally concerned" with the development of CIL. 98 Insofar as the organs operate within a normative structure (in this case, the main element of this structure is the Charter) and seek to attain the objectives ascribed to them in their respective mandates; they work under specific worldviews, promote understandings that match their worldviews, and demote others that do not. The problems that they define, the norms that they articulate and promote, they do so pursuant to their worldviews. This, by itself, strengthens certain norms and weakens others. Convention. 107 The US Government acknowledged that "like all other efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross" Protocol I "had certain meritorious elements".
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However, it asserted that "Protocol I is fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed". 109 The President lamented that the document should be rejected. 110 Nevertheless, the Government could "devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed conflicts". 111 The US Government intended to initiate consultations with its allies "to develop appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into rules that govern our military operation, with the intention that they shall in time win recognition as customary international law separate from their presence in Protocol I". 112 While the US Government intended to promote the collective institutionalisation of the provisions with the purpose of crystallising them as CIL, it could not guarantee that the objective would be attained. Hence, the point is that these organs may only hope to be able to affect the behaviour and the attitude of states. Depending on how much the behaviour and attitude of the latter changes, the new norms may acquire the character of CIL.
Nevertheless, it is possible, based on the above, to suggest some criteria for the identification of norms with the potential to become CIL. I argue that a norm displays this potential if it matches the normative framework of strong and well-established regimes, drawing significantly from their legitimacy and authority; when the norm does not challenge the expectations of states in manners that trigger the termination of the process of its own evolution, and when it is promoted through the combined efforts of organs of states and IOs. (2): "A resolution … may provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its development". 114 Hence, these activities do not serve only to "catalyse" state practice: they may, in fact, mould state practice because they may affect the identity of the states, the manner by which they define their own interests. Cf with Alvarez, above n 19, 258: "Describing GA or ILO resolutions as potential catalysts for generating customary law, perhaps the most popular way of describing their legal effect, does not begin to describe the diverse declarative, interpretative, condemnatory, or other functions of this kind of IO action". these activities are orientated at problem-solving, the type of prescriptions that they articulate often stretch the predominant understanding of the 'limits of the law'. For instance, recall the efforts of the 1998 working group on business and human rights, which the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established in response to multiplying reports of human rights abuses in the context of business activities, particularly within the extractive industries. 115 The Sub-Commission was composed of experts from different regions who acted on their personal capacity, and it constituted the main subsidiary organ of the Commission on Human Rights ('CHR'). 116 The working group submitted to the UN Sub-Commission in 2003, the so-called draft
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights, which the Sub-Commission adopted. 117 The document "solemnly proclaims these
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and urges that every effort be made so that they become generally known and respected". 118 The 2003 Draft Norms were received with disapproval by the CHR frameworks risk rejection by the political organs, especially if the procedure adopted for their formulation is perceived to be flawed. only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for example)". 125 See the landmark study Alvarez, above n 19, 262 (The author concludes that "IO organs, not just select few, [act] as law-makers in some sense, even though few of them are given explicit authority to legislate or to recommend").
a resolution, 126 formally presenting the principles as valid social norms. It is important to note the impossibility of pinpointing the instant at which a norm emerges-in fact, it seems that all one can hope is to find cues of its emergence. 127 As Finnemore and Sikkink explain, "norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study." 128 A resolution that clearly affirms a norm may constitute a strong cue that such a norm has emerged or is emerging within the community of states and IOs. Evidently, much will depend on the circumstances of its adoption and the respective vote tally: it is submitted that a resolution that is widely supported, notably if it takes the shape of a declaration, 129 may provide strong evidence of the emergence of the norms, which the resolution affirms. Besides, although not legally binding, these resolutions often promote the inversion of the burden of proof in favour of the emerging norms. 130 They may also establish an institutional environment that fosters compliance with these norms. Hence, the Secretariat can embed the emerging norm in different manners into its activities and the activities of the UN organs and agencies. Evidently, it is constrained by the expectations of the UN organs and those of the states. Nevertheless, it has enough room to promote a norm through different channels.
Cascade: managing compliance
Higgins was right when she noticed a thin distance between compliance and opinio juris. However, not all compliance-inducing mechanisms aim at moulding the attitude of the state-while some mechanisms clearly aim at persuading states, others aim at changing their behaviour by relying either on instruments that create social pressures or on instruments of material sanctions and rewards. 149 In the last two cases, the change of attitude may arise, but the main objective is the changing of behaviour. Nevertheless, pursuant to the principle of inertia, 150 the observer can reasonably expect that the behaviour prescribed or proscribed by the norm, once adopted or abandoned by the state, will remain adopted or abandoned because another change in behaviour will demand further justification.
In this framework, it is necessary to recall that UN organs may manage compliance-inducing mechanisms with the purpose of attaining acceptable levels of compliance. "based on the idea that nation states can be moved toward action in the global interest through managerial approaches that build new norms of state behaviour. This managerial approach is based on transparency, a clear articulation of the collective goal, attention to the state of the science, and opportunities for interaction and information sharing, along with the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances"). 152 Chayes and Chayes, above n 149. 153 See, for all, the important contribution by O Corten, 'La Participation du Conseil de Sécurité à l' Élaboration, à la Cristallisation où à la Consolidation des Règles Coutumières' (2004) 37 Revue Belge de Droit International 552-566. (The author adopts a cautious approach to the topic, does not deny the potential that the organ has to affect the development of CIL, but rejects the characterisation of the SC as a type of "international jury, apte à se prononcer sur la création ou la réforme des règles juridiques les plus fondamentales du droit international"). 154 As it is reflected in Draft Conclusions, UN Doc A/71/10.
resolutions. In addition, the SC has developed the practice of adopting quasi-legislative resolutions, and of imposing the same type of obligations on states and NSAs in similar contexts. Both practices may give rise to generalisable rules. However, acting on behalf of all UN members cannot, in itself, provide evidence that states view the obligations, which the SC imposes, as CIL.
Invoking the ability that the SC has to impose material sanctions will hardly help: states may comply without being convinced that they are legally required, least of all under CIL, to do so.
Furthermore, when a significant number of states reject SC attempts to enforce its prior decisions, the states-rather than the organ-prevail. 155 Even when the SC 'legislates', it-by definitioncannot create CIL because written laws do not automatically create CIL. 156 Evidently, if states fail to protest resolutions of the SC, their failure may eventually be deemed to constitute acquiescence, which may constitute a crucial factor in the generation of new CIL. 157 However, I argue that it is not only SC resolutions-and least of all only certain types of its resolutions-that can have this effect on the formation of CIL. In fact, it seems plausible to attribute the same potential to resolutions of the other UN political organs.
The present work offers an alternative approach that permits overcoming these challenges.
Indeed, I suggest that we drop the rather formalistic approach that attempts to ascertain the effect of SC resolutions on the formation of CIL. Instead, I propose to ascertain the effect that the resolutions and activities have-not directly on CIL but-on the evolution and strengthening of specific norms. Broadly speaking, as the resolutions of all UN political organs, SC resolutions may introduce new norms, fine-tune the mechanisms for managing compliance with it and affirm that a norm is CIL. However, the major role that the SC performs in promoting a norm is by managing compliance through fixing the meaning of specific aspects of the norm; the monitoring of compliance with it, and the provision of technical assistance to organs of states. Indeed, the SC has developed complex institutions, in the form of Sanctions Committees, which are capable of inducing compliance. These institutions begin by identifying cases of non-compliance and the reasons for non-compliance. This allows them to go much further than the mere employment of material sanctions. assistance in order to tackle cases of non-compliance. For example, the SC established a sanctions regime to counter the financing of terrorism. This regime promoted the clarification of the meaning of the prohibition of terrorism in different, and unexpected, manners: on the one hand, it made it clear that the prohibition of terrorism included prohibition of any form of financing of terrorism; on the other, the challenges that the sanctions regime faced promoted the clarification of the relationship between the prohibition of terrorism with fundamental rights of individuals suspected of involvement with the financing of terrorism. To an extent, this regime has also been successful in monitoring and managing state compliance. Whether, in a specific given case, the Sanctions Committee contributes to changing the behaviour and attitude of states, and bringing them to comply, implement and support the norm in question-is a crucial empirical question that must be answered through case studies. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework above provides the student with the instruments necessary to ascertain, in empirical terms, the weight that the SC resolutions and activities have in the evolution of norms. 158 legal-authority in respect to the formal ascertainment of a norm as CIL. Indeed, the SC has affirmed that the "principle … concerning the non-use of weapons against" aircraft in flight constituted CIL, 162 and that the use of chemical, biological, or toxic weapons constitute a violation of CIL. 163 However, this is different from the formal introduction of the norm to the international community that occurs at an earlier stage (emergence). 164 For instance, the GA adopted the UDHR
and the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space. 165 When the GA adopted these Declarations it formally presented the norms enshrined thereunder to the international community and this triggered a plethora of activities within the UN. At the moment of their adoption, it is highly questionable whether the GA and states saw the norms in question as CIL. 166 Hence, despite "solemnly declaring" those norms, the GA did something different from when it affirmed and strongly implied that, respectively, the prohibition of torture (and of cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment) and the crime of genocide were CIL.
The latter resolutions reflect a more mature stage in the life-cycle of the norms.
Conclusion
This work began by recalling Higgins' 'methods' though which states come to be bound by new Finally, the paper began with quotations of two ILC Conclusions and feels it should end by returning to them. Generally, the present work supports both Conclusions. However, some considerations are necessary. Although the Draft Conclusions formally aim at facilitating the identification of CIL, they cannot avoid the question of its formation. 171 Given the above, the expression "in certain cases" that opens Conclusion 4(2) seems too restrictive in respect to "formation" of CIL. 172 
